<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Eternalblue on Ethical Hacking | Pentest e Sicurezza Informatica | Hackita</title><link>https://hackita.it/tags/eternalblue/</link><description>Recent content in Eternalblue on Ethical Hacking | Pentest e Sicurezza Informatica | Hackita</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>it</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackita.it/tags/eternalblue/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Porta 139 NetBIOS Session: Null Session, EternalBlue e SMB Relay su AD</title><link>https://hackita.it/articoli/porta-139-netbios-session/</link><pubDate>Fri, 24 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://hackita.it/articoli/porta-139-netbios-session/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;La porta 139 espone &lt;strong&gt;NetBIOS Session Service&lt;/strong&gt; (NBSS) — il protocollo TCP legacy che trasporta SMB (Server Message Block) su NetBIOS, predecessore di SMB Direct (porta 445) e backbone del file sharing Windows pre-Windows 2000. NetBIOS Session su TCP porta 139 stabilisce sessioni affidabili per accesso file/printer sharing, autenticazione Windows, e IPC (Inter-Process Communication), operando come transport layer per operazioni SMB quando direct hosting (porta 445) non è disponibile. In penetration testing Active Directory, la porta 139 è &lt;strong&gt;vettore critico legacy&lt;/strong&gt; ma ancora presente: null session exploitation per user/share enumeration, credential brute force senza account lockout tipico, SMB relay attacks quando signing disabled, e lateral movement via authenticated SMB sessions. Ogni rete Windows con legacy systems (Windows 7/Server 2008) o backward compatibility enabled espone porta 139 accanto a 445, creando &lt;strong&gt;dual attack surface&lt;/strong&gt; — da anonymous enumeration a Pass-the-Hash exploitation.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>